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The numbers behind All Blacks' high ball struggles and the tactical change needed
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The parallels between 2009 and 2026 are well documented for the All Blacks, with the high ball security becoming the dominant issue following three losses to South Africa.
Much like 2009, the Springboks won 3-0 over the All Blacks with Fourie du Preez and both Steyns repeatedly putting up high balls. The wingers at the time, Joe Rokocoko and Sitiveni Sivivatu, two Fijian speedsters known for lethal running, couldn’t secure possession enough. The Boks fed off the resulting errors, that gave set piece and piggyback territorial wins.
It sounds like a familiar story with the All Blacks needing to find similar solutions to the Springboks kicking game.
The 2026 Greatest Rivalry Series was defined by the All Blacks inability to control the catch area. Knock ons became scrums, lost contests became second chance opportunities for South Africa.
The All Blacks’ catch rate from high balls in play or contested restarts kicked by South Africa across the four Tests were; 26 per cent (4/15), 33 per cent (5/15), 33 per cent (4/12) and 30 per cent (3/10).
As a total they are caught the ball just 30 per cent of the time.
New Zealand did not lose possession on every one of those balls not caught, most were, but not all. Some were knocked on in the air by South Africa, some loose balls were recovered by the All Blacks.
But the catch rate is important as South Africa almost prefer to knock the ball on, as long as they can recover it and force a scrum. The only way to completely negate that is to catch the ball.
Will Jordan ended as New Zealand’s best across the series with 7/14 South African high balls diffused at 50%. Jordie Barrett, renown as one of New Zealand’s best jumpers, went 0/3 in the first Test and had 3/6 in the second Test.
Barrett used the bat back multiple times which unfortunately ended up in South Africa’s possession. Another tactic that the All Blacks employed allowed Barrett to contest against his own teammates. This caused multiple turnovers with collisions in the air with each other.
The restart was continually a problem for New Zealand where South Africa frequently attacked the middle or Tupou Vaa’i’s side with the kickoff. He went 0/2 on aerial contests in the second Test and 0/3 in the third Test.
The wingers’ as a unit caught around 50 per cent of the time, but it was elsewhere where the All Blacks really struggled. Cam Roigard was 0/2 in the series, Anton Lienert-Brown was 0/3 on contested high kicks. The shorter box kick in behind the ruck often led to these situations where a winger wasn’t the one contesting.
The retreating player catch meant that the backfield were protected from the aerial battles. Ruben Love was required in just one aerial contest the entire series, the same as McKenzie at fullback.
In the fourth Test Josh Moorby was New Zealand’s best, taking two from three, but the smaller backfield of Richie Mo’unga and Damian McKenzie came under pressure after the catch.
With Mo’unga or McKenzie required to secure the breakdown, the Boks realised they can counter-ruck with all the momentum against this smaller player. This led to a key call when the ball popped out of the ruck and New Zealand were penalised for hands on the floor even though it came off Mo’unga’s foot.
On the other side of the coin, the Springboks were equally poor at securing the high ball with only Damian Willemse a secure catcher.
The missed opportunity for the All Blacks in this series was to use more contestable kicks of their own.
In the second Test they won back two from two from contested kicks, the third Test it was four from five, in the fourth Test it was one from one.
Despite this success, they persisted with long and deep kicking, and by the last Test South Africa were winning back most the kick metres on the kick return anyway.
The territorial game management by Roigard waned as the series went on, the All Blacks were guilty of overplaying phases for too long in the middle zones, particularly between their own 22 and halfway.
In the first Test, the kicking game in the final 20 minutes was what swung the game in the All Blacks’ favour.
Will Jordan won an aerial challenge from a Springboks’ box kick and found a flying Damian McKenzie for a monster line break on the kick return. They eventually forced a five metre scrum which led to the Luke Jacobson try. This momentum swing came from a transition phase, not phase play.
Quinn Tupaea produced a brilliant 50-22 from first phase following a scrum that pinned the Boks deep, and although that next attacking opportunity was lost, the All Blacks won another turnover. From that turnover, Jordie Barrett expertly put through another grubber kick that was recovered by the Springboks on the five metre line and pressure led to the yellow card to Marco van Staden.
When the All Blacks were chasing the game in the latter Tests, the abandoned the territory battle and were guilty of overplaying phases. They were attacked at the breakdown and lost many possessions to penalties to the likes of Malcolm Marx. Roigard sniping around the rucks led to multiple turnovers with players becoming isolated.
This is a big area that they need to look at, because the rewards are not coming from playing endless phases in midfield zones.
Despite the awe around the 32-phase try to Will Jordan in the fourth Test, few of the All Blacks’ tries came from long periods of phase play.
In the first Test, four tries came within three phases of a set-piece launch and the fifth was the charge down to Holland.
In the second Test they produced two superb strikes off midfield lineouts in the first half, tries to Cam Roigard and Damian McKenzie, both within two phases.
The second half try to Leroy Carter came direct from a breakdown turnover within one phase. Only the last try to Ardie Savea came from sustained phase play inside South Africa’s 22, and this is the best place on the field to play high phase counts.
As the fourth Test showed, they can score off high phase counts inside the opposition 22, which is the safest place to do so.
But elsewhere the All Blacks are better suited to playing off set piece launches where they can strike rather than playing phases endlessly between the 22s in the middle zone. More kicking can set up those opportunities.
There needed to be more kicking either contestables off Roigard or trying to find grass long and force the Boks to clear the lines and give the All Blacks a lineout. This is actually what they did in the first Test frequently.
Ruben Love was very good at picking the time to kick in this zone, while Richie Mo’unga didn’t show that, only kicking once the entire game.
Yes they were behind on the scoreboard in the latter Tests by two scores, but there was plenty of time. They needed patience, the phase play wasn’t going anywhere and they were conceding costly turnovers. The kick game can open up scoring opportunities in transition and from the lineouts they set up, which the All Blacks already proved was their best methods of scoring tries.
If the All Blacks review how they managed the first Test in the second half against all the others, they’ll see this difference clearly and it’s a big reason why they lost the series.
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