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Dave Rennie lifts lid on Timcoci Tavatavanwai's All Blacks omissions
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Wallabies’ warning signs were flashing at Eden Park under relentless All Blacks’ attack
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The All Blacks picked the Wallabies apart in the last 30 minutes at Eden Park, but the warning signs were there much earlier.
While the Wallabies have faced furious speed in Japan, mercurial power in Argentina, and blunt force trauma in South Africa, they couldn’t adapt to the All Blacks’ all-out onslaught.
The most similar type of attack- having several opposition players flooding the contact zone- was encountered by the Wallabies in July when they played France, where the Wallabies were also cut to shreds in the second half.
It’s not the physicality or the speed separately that troubled them overall; it was the combination with having too many bodies to track and tackle in the close quarters of the ball carrier.
This is not to be confused with physical dominance, because the Wallabies kept the All Blacks to 2.4m post-contact per carry on average, whereas the Wallabies enjoyed 2.5m per carry on average.
This speaks volumes to the starch in the Wallabies’ defence, considering the All Blacks averaged 2.8m per carry during the Greatest Rivalry Tour, and the Wallabies have until this point averaged just 2.3m.
So any narrative that the All Blacks’ power was too much for the Wallabies or that the Australian defence was too passive should be dispelled initially, but that does not change the fact that the Wallabies’ defence was badly outplayed by the All Blacks’ free-flowing, lightning-quick, and accurate attack.
The issue for the Wallabies was not stopping the All Blacks in their tracks; it was slowing the breakdown enough to get realigned in their defence.
This inability to impact the breakdown and ultimately get pilfers also meant the Wallabies had to make 204 tackles, 20 more than the Boks ever had to make during the GRT series.
While the Wallabies hit hard and scrambled desperately, they could only sustain it for around 10 phases at a time; after that, points often came.
Fraser McReight’s pilfering efforts made a difference in the first 55 minutes, but unfortunately, the All Blacks were always under advantage, so while he stopped the attack, his heroic deeds never swung momentum back in the Wallabies’ favour.
While McReight was doing his best at disrupting the breakdown, Jeremy Williams also managed a steal, but as mentioned, these efforts were too few and far between.
It meant the Wallabies’ forwards were often caught too narrow by All Blacks flyhalf Damien McKenzie, who was inspiring on front-foot ball at Eden Park.
If the Wallabies weren’t too narrow, they were disconnected, with retreating players unable to add to the defensive pressure the Wallabies were trying to exert.
Finally, if they weren’t narrow or disconnected in midfield, they were simply running poor lines in their bid to set the defence.
These are three big issues you don’t want in your defence when playing against the All Blacks, but the New Zealanders’ efficiency and pace at the breakdown caused a world of panic and hurt for the Wallabies, and it started as early as the 11th minute.
This clip is a front-foot masterclass by Damien McKenzie.
A Cam Roigard box kick, into Jordie Barrett out-leaping Joseph-Aukuso Suaalii, is the stuff of Kiwi dreams after the hellish time they had under the high ball in South Africa.
Regathering a kick like that on the opposition’s 40m line is as good as a linebreak, and you can see why.
It takes 2.5 seconds for Barrett to hit the deck and for Roigard to fizz it onto his forward pod, who are all steaming onto the ball.
The Wallabies No.5, 136kg Lukhan Salakaia-Loto, is still retreating while this is going on because he was at the bottom of the ruck where Roigard launched his kick.
Orange-booted Williams is the other Wallaby retiring in the backfield after trying to charge down Roigard’s kick.
The All Blacks had clearly identified that this is where the Wallabies would retreat to, and that’s where they chose to stress their seams, and doesn’t it just work a treat.
The Wallabies’ most experienced back, Len Ikitau, makes the situation so much worse by sprinting almost 10m out of the line in an attempt to shut down the play.
Unfortunately, his efforts make everything much worse; instead of covering Salakia-Loto’s retreat, Ikitau’s poor read opens up the space Lukhan is going to for the All Black’s to target.
Had Ikitau stayed, he, fellow centre Isaac Henry on the outside and mobile prop Angus Bell on the inside, likely would have managed to patch things together with Salakia-Loto eventually joining the line.
Ikitau’s rush leaves a gaping hole, and McKenzie needs no second invitation to that sort of acreage; he scythes through and draws and passes to Peter Lakai for the All Blacks’ first try.
This example highlights how the speed of the ball, the Wallabies’ poor individual misreads, and the All Blacks’ great reading of the play led to what was a scintillating yet seemingly too easy five-pointer.
It’s also worthy to note how many All Blacks jerseys filled the space once the linebreak was achieved, compared to how few Wallabies were in the picture.
Here we see how tight the spacing is between the Wallabies’ forwards in their bid to dominate the contact.
It leaves Ikitau and winger Max Jorgensen with halfback Ryan Lonergan drifting behind to defend half the width of the field against four All Blacks.
Once again, D-Mac’s speed is what gets the All Blacks No.10 through half a gap in this instance, where he offloads to a charging Wallace Sititi.
Where this goes wrong is that Ikitau wants Lonergan to join the defensive line; you can see him pointing at the space, but Lonergan is in halfback-drift mode and doesn’t fill the gaping hole in midfield.
Ikitau and Jorgensen should’ve shifted in once it was evident Lonergan wasn’t going to commit, as he should’ve; nonetheless, the lack of action here is both of their faults, and it results in Sititi making a 25-metre break, deep into Wallabies territory.
Again, what’s telling is how many All Blacks players are around the ball when the play appears to be breaking down, and conversely, how few Wallabies jerseys are in the picture at any one time.
The All Blacks end up scoring a few seconds later, and there, there are some other defensive concerns.
The Wallabies defended for eight phases before the line break was made, and then they kept the All Blacks out inside the 22m for an extra five phases.
What is truly concerning in this instance is the Wallabies’ inability to match the All Blacks’ numbers across the field.
When Beauden Barrett emerges from the second-to-last ruck before the try and shifts it to his brother Jordie, the entire All Blacks forward pack is inside the left-hand side 15m channel, except Lakai, who is on the right-hand wing.
Five of the Wallabies’ forwards have fanned out right, instead of guarding the base of the ruck, and the three forwards who were a part of the previous ruck have to make an exhausting second effort.
The speed of the All Blacks’ ball, Roigard’s jinking run, and the Wallabies’ poor space identification see Tupou Vaii go over for the All Blacks’ second try.
This inability to fill gaps and space effectively is what cost the Wallabies dearly on a number of occasions, despite doing well for several phases in bashing the All Blacks’ carriers.
The way the maul is officiated currently, a successful maul set up within 7m of the opponent’s try line is almost a guaranteed try.
To defend a maul with the current rules is nigh impossible if you don’t halt the initial shove, so this particular example is not a criticism of the Wallabies maul defence but again about how they defend the space around the resulting ruck.
Captain Harry Wilson in the red headgear, McReight in the white, and tighthead prop Allan Alaalatoa, who is the second last to detach himself from the maul, are the three Wallabies forwards who swing to defend the blindside.
If you’re Wallabies defence coach Scott McLeod, you’re sitting the pack down and asking why these lads filled in the way they did.
McReight initially sets at the ‘10 pillar’ position, or the closest to the ruck.
When he sees Wilson come around the ruck, it appears as though he suspects Wilson to fill his spot at 10 and he, McReight, can spread to ‘20’, the next slot out.
While this is all going on, McReight is looking at All Blacks halfback Roigard because he wants to ensure he can’t snipe whilst pushing wider to make room for Wilson, but his captain never comes.
Rather than filling at ‘10 ’, Wilson runs to what is now ‘30 ’, and Alaalatoa is left in the lurch, having to run around Bell and Lonergan, who have been brilliantly held by winger Leroy Carter and can only grab onto Roigard’s legs as he dives over for the All Blacks’ first try of the second half.
Any defence coach will say if the opposition are inevitably going to score, then make the resulting kick for goal harder and let them score on the outside, never through the middle.
It feels like a principle that was entirely forgotten here, and the All Blacks looked inevitable in these pictures, with backs and forwards stacked on the blindside just lining up to score the try.
This final clip is a very similar example to the second clip where after a couple of phases the All Blacks break into the Wallabies 22m zone.
Once there, the Wallabies do well to keep the All Blacks out for 13 phases in total, but in the end, captain Codie Taylor wrong-foots an exhausted Bell at the line and dives over for a try, truly opening the floodgates for the tries to come.
Two things are key to note here: first, the sheer number of contacts the Wallabies tacklers are dominant in, and secondly, how efficient the All Blacks are at cleaning out the would-be Wallaby jackalers.
Also important to caveat this final point is just how ineffective some of the Wallaby jacklers were in this set of 13 phases.
A teething problem in McLeod’s new defensive system is, as can be seen in this clip very clearly, that often both tacklers are working to dominate the contact, and it leaves no one to slow down the ruck.
This takes two Wallabies players off their feet for every one All Blacks carrier, and it leaves the Wallabies short of players, forcing them to work harder to fold, spread, and connect.
It is a teething issue, as once the side learns to time these efforts and to ultimately capitalise on them, the system will not only be highly effective in stopping attackers but in creating turnover opportunities.
However, in this case, too many Wallabies are whacking and not enough are looking to slow down the ball, and it must be said, the All Blacks do an awesome job of fighting on the ground to get the ball cleanly to their halfback, Roigard.
As seen in these clips, right throughout the game, the Wallabies were struggling with the pace and quantity of All Blacks runners.
Review this week will be grim viewing for every single one of the Wallabies team, even captain Wilson at times, who made 28/28 tackles, in what can only be described as a herculean effort.
It’s not about a lack of effort; it’s not about the Wallabies’ buzzword belief; it’s about smarts and knowing when to whack, when to hold, and when to make the extra effort.
The Wallabies didn’t lose at Eden Park because they weren’t physical enough or because they were too passive, which some pundits will have you believe.
The Wallabies lost at the weekend because they were unable to steal the All Blacks’ ball, slow down their ruck speed, and turn their dominant hits into a prolonged contest as opposed to a one-second battle.
To put a number on this, the All Blacks won four turnovers, the Wallabies just two.
However, overall, the All Blacks lost 13 turnovers and the Wallabies just seven.
It’s important to point out that these turnover numbers for the Wallabies are overall better, but with fewer turnover wins when compared to the games against Japan, Argentina, and South Africa, so the number of turnovers lost is not a big issue for the side; they simply need to win about four more turnovers in Sydney.
Comparatively, the All Blacks’ numbers at Eden Park were worse than against the Boks in the GRT, winning fewer turnovers and turning over the ball about the same amount themselves.
The Wallabies will be better in Sydney, and it starts with acknowledging that South Africa put a premium on pilfering, and that comes down to Les Kiss and his assistant’s selections at the weekend.
The Wallabies squad available to Kiss has the answers, the team has the belief, and coaches know what the fixes are.
However, as sure as the sun rises, the All Blacks will know they were kept at bay for 50-odd minutes, and they won’t want a repeat of that.
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