Wallabies' defensive woes demand overhaul to avoid Murrayfield bloodbath

The Wallabies have conceded 40-plus points in their last three fixtures; this is not to mention the 38 the Springboks scored against them in the Perth thriller in September.

This is simultaneously a coaching issue and not a coaching issue, because the Wallabies have struggled to keep sides to low scores for years, regardless of who the coach is.

The issue is that a connected linespeed defence system is no longer a viable option when you are teasing out new combinations week after week.

It requires battle-hardened combinations and strong connections amongst the key defensive players, something the Wallabies have shown they lack in the last three games.

The game of rugby is currently skewed to favour the attacking side with how the game is officiated, and that puts additional pressure on defences.

Defence coaches around the world are now having to accept that their sides are almost inevitably going to concede around three tries per game, whereas previously it was a realistic goal to keep sides to zero tries.

In this climate, the greatest weapon defences have against this fact and attacks that have momentum is to employ a blitz, to cut down time and space and to pressure the skill sets of the attacking players; nothing else works.

A change of strategy has been a long time coming, with the Springboks now the most adept side in the world at the rush after years of honing their system, and while connected linespeed movements still have their moments, the days of it being an overarching system are now long gone.

Wallabies coach Les Kiss acknowledged his frustrations at the lack of improvement in the Wallabies defence and says work is being done to make it more aggressive.

“We know there’s work to do there; we are just working through some habits that have existed and just trying to shift the dial a little bit, to be a little more pressure-based in our defence, it’s just not coming together for us, for sure,” Kiss said post-match at Twickenham.

“The bottom line is we just have to be better, we have to be better.”

Now, while it would be too broad-brush to say that there haven’t been any changes made from the previous defence coach Laurie Fisher to the current one in Scott McLeod, there is too much clutter currently in the system.

Players are consistently missing roles that should be muscle memory at Test-level.

The Wallabies must simplify their defensive ideology.

McLeod must strip back the detail from a coverage perspective and go back to basics, because this cohort of Wallabies players are not getting it right eight games into his tenure as defence coach.

What’s worse is that it doesn’t look to be trending in the right direction.

Get up, take man-for-man, hit hard, set at the 10-pillar and work out from there, and keep the pressure high.

[Clip 1 Feyi-Waboso try]

Feyi-Waboso try

This first example of the Wallabies’ disconnected “connected linespeed” defence shows players making poor initial decisions, and a lack of cohesion results in three players taking three individual, different courses of action.

The first poor effort is by Fraser McReight in white headgear, who, without Max Jorgensen to assist, likely slips off and misses the tackle on England’s no.8 Ben Earl.

The second mistake comes in the next phase where Lukhan Salakaia-Loto tackles black headgear wearing Seb Atkinson when in fact his man to mark is the English no.13 Henry Slade.

This one poor read sends the three Wallabies players outside of him into a panicked frenzy in an attempt to rectify his mistake.

The man directly outside LSL is Len Ikitau, who now has to shift in one and cover Slade; the next defender out is his centre partner Isaac Henry, who jams English flyhalf Fin Smith.

Now, in this instance, the jam in of itself is not a total misread, but it is the wrong decision because it is not communicated to others.

Here, the Wallabies have a connected linespeed because there is a three-on-two overlap in England’s favour; the right thing to do here is to jockey and wait until Ikitau reconnects from the inside.

Had the defender outside Henry, Joseph-Auskuso Suaalii also jammed, then perhaps the Wallabies would’ve stopped the attack there.

However, this is not a certainty as the Wallaby defender furthest out on the wing, Tom Wright in the no.15 jersey, would’ve had to follow Suaalii in as well, and he is about 2m deeper than where he needs to be.

He would’ve had the job to cover two players as well as the pass for the cut out, but at least it would’ve put England’s skills under pressure.

With LSL making the wrong call, Ikitau jamming early, Henry following suit but being a step too late, Suaalii late on the hop are all ingredients of the perfect storm which allows Immanuel Feyi-Waboso to surge through the gap and score.

[Clip 2 Scrum defence]

Scrum defence

There is no reason for Ikitau and Henry to be so far behind where white headgear-wearing Declan Meredith is as he goes to make the tackle on black headgear-wearing Atkinson.

Ikitau and Henry have given their English centre opponents two metres of clear air to do as they please.

While Ikitau still remains relatively square, Henry’s hips and shoulders are facing straight to the sideline.

This is such a clear and obvious example of how the mindset needs to shift for the Wallabies. Ikitau and Henry should have the mentality to be up and on top of their opposing centres, so they can be ready to swim through onto no.10 Smith out the back.

All their jockeying here does is kick the proverbial can down the road and create a two-on-one for winger Max Jorgensen against full-back George Furbank and try scorer Feyi-Waboso.

The Wallabies cede 40m off one phase; and at that point, you’re asking too much of your forwards to realign effectively; you must come up and in, trusting your scramble.

The Wallabies are just fortunate that England ran direct and narrow in the subsequent phase, because had they attacked outside the 30-channel, they likely would have scored.

The Wallabies would do better in forcing a kick or a double cut out here and trust their speed across the ground while the ball is in the air; there is simply too much territory being lost without forcing England into a decision.

[Clip 3 Kick return]

Kick return

In this clip, it clearly highlights how the Wallabies aren’t identifying numbers well in their system, and whether it is down to players’ inability, defensive mindset, or a lack of communication, the issues must stop now.

After the first phase is set, England attack the short side where five Wallaby defenders are covering six English attackers.

Because the ruck is set in midfield, backfield coverage can be tricky, but it’s clear that the Wallabies backfield pendulum is not working hard enough to give fullback Wright the confidence to come up and give the Wallabies defence line the confidence to be aggressive.

The big reason why the backfield motion matters so much is that England have crossed halfway, and therefore cannot kick a 50/22m.

In the second phase where England attack down the same narrow edge, the Wallabies have a trickier predicament, defending three on four in 15m.

In this situation, two basic errors are made: first, LSL doesn’t react fast enough to set at the 10-pillar on the short side, and then no.9, Ryan Lonergan, slips off a tackle he should make on Feyi-Waboso.

Again, not filling space intelligently means that the Wallabies put themselves in situations which require spot tackles, which are usually reserved for a blitz defence anyway. The writing for a change in system is on the wall.

While missing tackles outright is not acceptable, there are simply too many situations where the Wallabies system at present is leaving certain players at a greater disadvantage in their pursuit of connection.

[Clip 4 Chessum try]

Chessum try

This clip has a very simple lesson: if a lock-forward is scoring on the edge having run 20m in open space, then the system definitely won’t work for a winger, and is therefore not fit for purpose.

A great pull-out of the pack by England no.3 Joe Heyes allows Smith to ball play to a swinging backline of four backs and Chessum on the wing against four Wallabies defenders.

Henry, Ikitau, Jorgensen, and Meredith in the white headgear on the end are all in a passive jockeying position only 14m from their own try-line.

What exacerbates this passive set-up is the lack of effort from fullback Wright and halfback Lonergan to be hauling their poverbials to get across and cover for a kick.

What that would also do is give the Wallabies in the frontline the confidence to go into a higher linespeed rush, as they know their reinforcements will get across and cover space and Chessum.

But a lack of effort, a lack of a defensive leader in all this, and Chessum surges over the try line in the corner.

[Clip 5 Good, good, bad]

Good, good, bad

In this clip, the Wallabies actually do well to get off the line after the initial Pollock break down the left touchline.

For two phases the Wallabies catch England behind the gainline, but it’s all undone because LSL doesn’t set 10-pillar correctly and he gets beaten on the inside by halfback Jack van Poortlivet,

Any rugby player will tell you that ‘you don’t get beaten on the inside at 10-pillar, ever ‘; it should be a physical impossibility.

This is compounded by the three Wallabies whose job it is in the subsequent phase to secure the ruck, who also fail to set 10-pillar properly.

The result is three Wallabies- Angus Bell, McReight, and Meredith all tackling one English player, no.8 Earl.

This was a major issue for the Wallabies against the All Blacks in the two Bledisloe Cup matches, and it has reared its head again, no doubt because England reviewed the Wallabies and saw what we see now.

McLeod and Kiss need to make setting the 10-pillar a non-negotiable and a first port of call, and that has to happen now. Wallabies can’t keep being breached around the ruck at will like this.

[Clip 6 Pollock try]

Pollock try

This final clip highlights why connection and aggression are so important off set piece, particularly in the centres.

It is a great set piece strike play by England off a left-hand-side lineout.

The halfback goes wide, which gives the attack extra width as he throws a flat cut out, getting England into centre field off two passes.

Once in centre field, Ikitau shoots to make a spot tackle, and Henry sits on his heels when there is no logical reason for him to do so.

It highlights, as many other examples have, that he is a defender who prefers to be passive.

It’s not that he is shy of contact, but his default is to hold and jockey, and that is not a good way to be when Kiss says he and McLeod are trying to get rid of “habits” and want to be more “pressure-based”.

Henry holds, presenting a checkerboarded defensive line for England to run into, and they need no second invitation.

Ikitau’s good rush, coupled with Henry’s hold, means in the swing-and-dig pattern the English run, it’s as easy to draw and pass with a little Henry Pollock pace and flair to finish it off.

Pollock now thinks being an international winger is easy, and you can’t blame the young backrower for thinking that; he sure made it look so easy at the weekend.

The right players must now be trusted, the system’s protocols must be stripped back, and it starts from the 10-pillar and then out.

The Wallabies are running out of time to bed in a new defensive mindset which they desperately need.

McLeod and Kiss need to make it simple: up and in, get off that line and hit the bloke square in front of you, because any suggestion that the connected line speed is preventing linebreaks and, by extension, points, is utterly indefensible now.

The Wallabies have conceded 40-plus points in all three of the most recent games; cumulatively, that is 138 points.

Attack is the name of the game at present, but 40 points is too much at any time for anyone to overcome; the bleeding has to stop now.